University of Miami Law Review
Volume 29

Number 1

Article 8

10-1-1974

Proposed Rule 3A12-5 - A High Price for an Exemption from
Regulation T for Condominium Securities
Bruce S. Goldstein
Robert J. Van Der Wall

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bruce S. Goldstein and Robert J. Van Der Wall, Proposed Rule 3A12-5 - A High Price for an Exemption
from Regulation T for Condominium Securities, 29 U. Miami L. Rev. 89 (1974)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol29/iss1/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.

PROPOSED RULE 3a12-5-A HIGH PRICE FOR AN
EXEMPTION FROM REGULATION T FOR
CONDOMINIUM SECURITIES
BRUCE
I.

S.

GOLDSTEIN* AND ROBERT J.

VAN DER WALL*
89
90

III.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................
DEFINITION OF A SECURITY ................................................
A CONDOMINIUM AS A SECURITY ...........................................

IV.

STATUTORY FRAMEW ORK ...................................................

97

II.

V.

A . Section 11(d)(1) .......................................................
B. Section 7 and Regulation T ............................................
C . Brokers and Dealers ...................................................

97
98
100

STATUTORY ANALYSIS .....................................................

104

A . Section 11(d)(1) .......................................................
B. Section 7 and Margin Requirements ....................................
1.

PREVENTING THE EXCESSIVE USE OF CREDIT .............................

104
105
106

2.

PREVENTING UNDUE MARKET FLUCTUATIONS .............................
PROTECTING THE MARGIN PURCHASER FROM HIMSELF .................

108
109

3.

VI.

VII.

93

PROPOSED RULE 3a12-5 ....................................................
A. Analysis of Proposed Rule 3a12-5 Suitability .............................
B. Other Conditions of the Rule ...........................................
CONCLUSION .............................................................

I.

109
111
115
117

INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission' has indicated that
under certain circumstances condominiums may be deemed to be
securities.2 Projects which involve securities are subject to numerous
comprehensive federal securities laws plus a plethora of complex SEC
rules and regulations. These laws were written and have usually been
construed to deal with the characteristics that are peculiar to ordinary
stocks and bonds, not to real estate. Condominiums, however, remain
essentially a real estate commodity that must be marketed and
financed as real estate, that is, with conventional mortgage loans
furnished by local lending institutions. The imposition of securities
laws into this traditional setting can have severe results for the securities bar, condominium developers and purchasers.
For example, triggering of the securities laws requires that the
developer prepare and file with the Commission a costly, time consuming registration statement, 3 unless an exemption is available. 4 But
even if an exemption is available, the broad anti-fraud provisions of
* Members of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Hereinafter referred to as the Commission or the SEC.
2. See section III infa.
3. Registration costs are known to vary, but have ranged upwards to $125,000 for an 81 unit
registration. Ellsworth, Condominums are Securities? 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 694 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ellsworth]. For a comprehensive checklist for the contents of a condominium
registration statement, see Klein, Preparationof an SEC Registration Statementfor an Offering of
Condominium Units, 2 REAL ESTATES L.J. 461 (1974).
4. Exempted securities and exempted transactions are described in sections 3 and 4, respectively, of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, d (1970).
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the laws still apply.' In addition, the laws provide severe restrictions on
the means and content of advertising. 6 The cost of compliance with
these laws will, of course, eventually pass to the consumer, whose
7
protection is the object of securities regulation.
Perhaps the most complex and perplexing ramifications that may
arise from the inclusion of this field under the securities umbrella stem
from the possible determination that condominium developers and
sales people may be securities brokers and dealers. This result invokes
myriad regulations 8 concerning broker-dealer conduct and brings into
play the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation T, 9 which establishes
margin requirements. Fortunately, the Commission has recognized this
problem and has proposed a new rule' 0 that would under certain
conditions suspend the operation of the margin requirements and section 11(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 which regulates
the extension of credit in purchase of certain real estate securities, in
return for specified regulatory and disclosure requirements.
The thrust of this comment is to examine this SEC proposal in the
light of the pre-existing statutory framework, 12 taking into account the
legislative purposes of the appropriate provisions of the statutes and
the applicability of these provisions to the unique character of condominium securities. As a prelude, the evolution of the definition of a
security to include condominiums is first explored.
II.

DEFINITION OF A SECURITY

The federal securities laws were enacted in the 1930's partially as
a result of the calamitous stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression, but these laws had been presaged by substantial
state regulation of securities and centuries of English regulatory law. 13
The Securities Act of 193314 was the first federal enactment and
5. See, e.g., section 77q(c) the 1933 Act, which states that "[t]he exemptions provided in
section 77c of this title shall not apply to the [antifraud] provisions of this section." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(c) (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
7. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). In his March 29, 1933 message to the

Congress, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said:
There is . . . an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities to be sold
in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that

no essentially important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying
public ....
* . . The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public . ...
Id. at 2.
8. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1974).
9. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Regulation T].
10. Proposed Rule 3a12-5, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d) (1) (1970).

12. Only federal securities
thereunder are discussed. The
regulate securities transactions
13. See generally 1 Loss,

21,195 (June 7, 1974).

laws and the appropriate SEC rules and regulations promulgated
effects of "Blue Sky" laws, enacted in every state and which
within the states, are not considered.
SECURITIES REGULATION, ch. 1 (2d ed. 1961).

14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
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adopted a broad catchall definition of a security 5 that was largely
obtained from the existing statutes. ' 6 This definition was often cited in
the early cases without elaboration 17 or was construed broadly'"
merely because it was remedial legislation.' 9 Subsequent federal decisions determined the meaning of such ambiguous terms as an "invest20
ment contract" in the statute.
The landmark definitional case is SEC V. W.J. Howey Co., which
construed an investment contract as "a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
to expect profits solely from the efforts of [others]." 2 1 Howey was
significant because, among other things, it explicitly broadened the
definition of a security to embody a concept "capable of adaptation to
meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the
use of money of others on the promise of profits." '2 2 The case arose
from the efforts of the W.J. Howey Co. and its affiliate, Howey-in-the
Hills Service, Inc., to sell to the general public narrow strips of citrus
grove acreage in conjunction with a cultivation and marketing service
contract. Profits from the harvest were to be allocated among the
purchasers based upon a check made at the time of picking. The
United States Supreme Court held that the promotion constituted an
illegal offer of a security and the defendants were enjoined from using
interstate facilities for the scheme.
It should be noted that the Howey definition of a security is really
a statement of the economic relationship existing between the investor
and the promoter.23 The funds from a number of investors are pooled
15. As amended in 1934, the term "security" is now defined as:
[Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest
in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security," or any certificate of interest of participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any ot the toregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970).
16. Mofsky, Some Comments on The Expanding Definition of a Security, 27 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 395 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mofsky].
17. Id. at 398.
18. SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wash. 1940). See also SEC. v. C.M. Joiner
Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). The Joiner court stated:
[Tlhe reach of the [1933 Securities] Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also
reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under
terms or courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as "investment contracts", or as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.'
Id. at 351.
19. SEC v. Starmont, 31 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wash. 1940).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970).
21. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). This concept will hereinafter be referred to as the Howey
test.
22. Id. at 299.
23. Tew & Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the
Parameters of the Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the Securities
Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 407 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tew & Freedman].
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to produce a profit from a business venture which is controlled not by
the investor, but by the promoter. This concept provided a relatively
stable framework that post-Howey courts used for some years to cut
through form to the substance of numerous imaginative schemes,
without significant change in the definition of a security. 2 4 Such pro25
motions ranged all the way from the sale of trust deeds or mortgages
to beavers,2 6 and were usually tested against the precise language of
Howey.
Despite the widespread use of the Howey test, there have been
numerous difficulties in applying it to different schemes that have
managed to evade its express terms but should have been subject to
securities regulation. For example, where the investor gives value in
the form of his labor as well as (or in place of) money, the promotion is
not a pure investment of money, nor does it involve an expectation of
profits solely from the efforts of others. 2 7 Similarly, there have been
difficulties in applying the term "common enterprise ' 28 and determining what is an "expectation of profit. ' '2 9 Some courts and legal commentators have also raised the element of risk as a necessary part of
30
the definition of a security.
Consequently, a marked uncertainty in the definition of a security
has been generated, making it extremely difficult for securities attorneys to advise clients when registration of an offering is required. In
addition, the proliferation of definitions of a security will naturally
result in a significant increase in the number of enterprises which will
31
be subject to the burden of federal securities regulation.
24. See generally Mofsky, The Expanding Definition of "Security" under the Blue Sky Laws,
1 SEc. REG. L.J. 217 (1973).
25. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mtg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
26. Continental Mkt. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
27. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
28. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mtg. Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960). The court
in Trust Deed suggested that a common enterprise is present where the economic welfare of the
investor' is "inextricably woven" into the business fortunes and skill of the promoter. Id. at 172.
29. See Tew & Freedman, supra note 23.
30. The element risk was seen as the essential ingredient in the definition of a security in
the well known case of Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13
Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). The decision in Silver Hills arose under the California Blue Sky law
definition of a security and involved the sale of memberships in an unfinished country club. The
proceeds of the sale were to be used to complete the facilities and the purchasers were to have no
right to the income or assets of the club, thus eliminating any profit expectation, The court held
that the California statute was designed to protect the public against spurious schemes of
whatever forms that were intended to obtain "risk capital." The Silver Hills court never defined
the term, but "risk capital" was clearly intended not only to circumvent the expectation of profit
element of the Howey test (which was absent from the promotion sub judice), but also to recognize
that risk of loss is an essential attribute of security.
Others courts subsequently seized upon and extended the risk capital theory as a means of
expanding the definition of a security to meet the exigencies of multilevel distributorships and
from clauses that probably would not have been securities under the Howey test. Unfortunately,
these courts have reached differing conclusions as to what constitutes a security, although the risk
capital concept is generally used in some form. See generally Tew & Freedman, supra note 23;
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 367, 381-82 (1967).
31. See Mofsky, supra note 16.
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III.

A

CONDOMINIUM AS A SECURITY

The expansion in the definition of a security spilled over into the
resort condominium 3 2 industry in the mid-60's, when the Commission
first advised a resort condominium developer that he was selling
securities 33 and that he would have to comply with the registration
3
provisions 34 of the Securities Act of 1933. 5
Although subsequently the SEC issued a release 36 dealing with
the sale of joint or profit sharing ventures, or limited partnership
interests, in real estate four months after the effective date of an early
condominium prospectus, 37 no explicit mention was made of condominiums. Of course, such forms of ownership had been commonly
used since the early 1950's by real estate syndicates to construct primary residences, 38 but the release did not directly tie in this fact.
Moreover, there appears to have been few reported SEC rulings on
whether a condominium constituted a security until 1971, when the
Commission released correspondence dealing with a number of requests for no action letters. 3 9 In response to one such request by an
attorney for an undisclosed client, the Commission staff replied that
under the facts given, the offering would have to comply with the
federal securities laws. The proposal was for a public sale of condominiums built in the Grand Bahama Islands on terms which required a 20 year leaseback to a subsidiary of the vendor. The offering
envisioned only vacation usage by the owners, with rental agent services to the owners to produce income, maintenance service and automobile transportation service provided by the subsidiary. The rental
income was expected only to cover maintenance costs and reduce the
mortgage debt, but the SEC staff apparently felt the scheme was
32. Of course, condominiums sold for non-resort purposes are usually not securities since
they are not primarily purchased for investment purposes, and fail to meet other aspects of the
risk capital and Howey tests. Nevertheless, they are subject to real estate regulation. See, e.g.,
Florida Condominium Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 711 (1973).
33. When the SEC intervened, the Hale Kaanapali Apartment Hotel Development Co. had
sold 152 of 253 condominium units in a resort structure that was to be operated as a hotel on the
island of Maui in Hawaii, The plan envisioned rental of the unoccupied units for the owners by
the developer, who offered to act as agent for the owners. The SEC intervention resulted in the
return of over $200,000 to owners who elected to rescind their purchases, in addition to
substantial additional expense. Rohan, The Securities Law Implications Of Condominium Marketing Programs Which Feature A Rental Agency Or Rental Pool, 2 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Rohan].
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1970).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
36. SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4877, [1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
77,462 (Aug. 8, 1967).
37. Prospectus of the "Hale Kaanapali Apartment Hotel Development Co." dated April 13,
1967. See Rohan, supra note 33.
38. Clurman, Are Condominiums Securities?, 65 PLI CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT (SECOND) 103, 104 (1972).
39. A no action letter is a response by the staff of the Commission to a written request by
counsel as to whether a proposed course of conduct would, in the staff's opinion, require
compliance with the federal securities laws. It name comes from the fact that if the proposed
conduct was in fact adhered to, the staff would recommend to the Commission that no action of
an enforcement nature be taken against the party inquiring.
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sufficiently 40close to the definition of a security to warrant investor
protection.
However, in a second request at about the same time, the staff
reached the opposite conclusion and issued a no action letter to the
inquiring party. 41 The case involved a plan to build condominiums
next to a resort hotel owned by an affiliate developer. The condominiums were to have their own recreational facilities. Sales were to
be made by a registered real estate broker, but no representations were
to be made to prospective purchasers regarding rental possibilities,
even though they were conceded to exist if action was initiated by the
42
owner after purchase. Significantly, no rental services were offered.
Despite the release of a number of requests for no action letters,
the Commission appears to have taken little formal action to promulgate its views on the necessity of federal securities regulation of resort
condominium sales until 1972, when the SEC established the Real
Estate Advisory Committee. 43 The REAC made its report to the
Commission on October 12, 1972, recommending, inter alia, that the
Commission "continue to regulate real estate securities pursuant to the
1933 and 1934 Acts' disclosure approach, intensifying disclosure and
increasing policing and reporting standards. '44 The REAC also attempted to better define the circumstances under which a con45
dominium is a security.
Certain of the REAC recommendations were adopted by the SEC
on January 4, 1973, when the Commission issued its Release No.
33-534746 under the 1933 Securities Act. The release was issued as a
warning that compliance with the federal securities acts would be
40. Edward S. Jaffry, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,395 (1971).
41. Surftides Condominiums, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REp.
78,686 (1972).
42. In addition to these requests, the Commission staff, in 1971, indicated in response to two
other inquiries that registration as broker-dealers under the Securites Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78c et seq. (1970) would be required of real estate salesmen dealing with resort
condominiums. Haystack Hotel Ass'n, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 78,049 (1971); San Diego-Maui Group, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 78,444 (1971). See text accompanying notes 87-121 infra.
43, The Real Estate Advisory Committee [hereinafter referred to as REAC] was appointed
by then Commission Chairman William J. Casey, on May 3, 1972, for the purposes of assisting
"the Commission in the review of its disclosure procedures and policy objectives in the area of
real estate security interests." Ellsworth, supra note 3, at 695-96.
44, Report of the SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,265, at 82,773 (Oct. 12, 1973). The applicable sections are, respectively,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa, and 78a et seq. (1970).
45. The definition proposed by the REAC included a condominium as security (1) when it is
offered with a rental pool, (2) when the purchaser is required to rent his unit for part of the year,
(3) when the purchaser is obligated to employ the developer as an exclusive rental agent, or (4)
when the developer provides management services with an unusually long term contract. Report
of the SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP.
79,265, at 82,775 (Oct. 12, 1972).
46. Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Law to Offers and Sales of
Condominiums or Units in Real Estate Development, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 79,163 (Jan. 4, 1973).
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required under certain circumstances, which were defined in the release. The Commission pointed out that it was aware that there was
uncertainty about when condominium offerings were securities, and
that the release was intended to provide guidelines as to when securities
law compliance would be necessary to businessmen engaged in build47
ing and selling condominium units.
The release explained that an offer to sell a condominium in
conjunction with certain services could constitute an offer of an investment contract, 48 as defined by the Howey test, 4 9 thus requiring

securities law compliance. The Commission emphasized that condominiums will be deemed to be securities if they are offered and sold
through promotions which emphasize economic benefits to the
purchaser.5 0 The release summarized the circumstances which would
cause an offering to be deemed a security:
1. The condominiums, with any rental arrangement or other
similar service, are offered and sold with emphasis on the
economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the
managerial efforts of the promoter, or a third party designated or arranged for by the promoter, from rental of the
units.
2. The offering of participation in a rental pool arrangement;
and
3. The offering of a rental or similar arrangement whereby
the purchaser must hold his unit available for rental for
any part of the year, must use an exclusive rental agent or
is otherwise materially restricted in his occupancy or rental of his unit.
In all of the above situations, investor protection requires
the application of the federal securities laws.5 1
Unfortunately, Release No. 33-5347 apparently did not provide as
much guidance to condominium developers as might have been hoped;
the Commission staff, in the eight months following issuance of the
release, found itself dealing with a significant number of requests for
no action letters. 52 While strict compliance with the release's guidelines
resulted in the sought after no action letters,5 3 many staff responses
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 82,536.
Id.
See text accompanying note 21 supra.
Guidelines to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of

Condominiums or Units in Real Estate Development, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP.

79,163, at 82,539-40 (Jan. 4, 1973).

51. Id.
52. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 219, C-2 (1973).
53. See, e.g., K.A.C. of Vail, Colo., Id. at C-3. The developer planned to sell condominium
units through a licensed real estate broker, who would offer them as second homes, not
investments. Care of the condominium common elements would be achieved and paid for
through an association of all owners. Inquiries from prospective purchasers regarding rentals
were to be answered with the statement that owners would have to make their own arrangements.
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apparently turned on fine points, not really covered by the release
itself.
For example, in Spring Realty Co., Inc.,5 4 the Commission staff
indicated that it was unable to express an opinion upon whether
securities law compliance was necessary, leaving the developer and his
attorney to make the decision. In that case, the developer offered the
condominiums to prospective buyers as both residential and investment property and offered to act as a rental agent for owners who
chose not to live there all year." In contrast, the case of North Shore
Project5 6 resulted in a denial of a no action letter. The Commission
stated that although "mere notice of the existence of rental services...
does not make a condominium offering one of securities,5 7 reference to
rental income and consequential tax benefits might constitute the
"economic benefits" emphasis that Release No. 33-5347 included in the
definition of a security. In this case, the staff concluded that even
though rental income was only to be used to offset costs, it could still
be the "economic benefit" that would render the offering a security. 58
But in Kaanapali Properties,5 9 a no action letter was forthcoming
despite the fact that the developer advertised the tax advantage of
condominium ownership. Perhaps significantly, this representation
was not coupled with offers of rental services, nor was there prospective data regarding rental income.
An examination of numerous requests for no action letters and
the staff responses to them does not result in any clear picture of when
securities law compliance is necessary. It would appear that the decisions may partly be based on the manner of presentation, 60 but,
regardless, the circumstances under which a condominium may be a
security are not well defined. Moreover, the SEC has recently indicated that it will no longer issue no action letters in the condominium
area and that it does not wish prior no action letters to be relied upon
6
as indications of future Commission action. '
54. Id. at C-4.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id., quoting the SEC response.
58. Id.
59. Id. at C-5,
60. Id. at C-7.
61. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 252, C-1 (1974). The BNA report stated, in part, that
[w]hether or not the offering of a security is involved depends upon all the facts of a
particular case, and variations in the facts of the cases might lead to different results.
While no-action letters are limited to the facts presented, the staff said, and do not
represent an interpretation of the law even as to these, the Commission is concerned
that inferences might be drawn from the issuance of no-action letters in this rapidly
evolving area. Such inferences could lead to misunderstanding as to the Commission's
position, and to contentions in future situations that the Commission had taken a
position that it in fact had not taken. The Commission has consequently directed the
staff not to issue no-action letters in this area, and to advise that no-action letters issued
in the past in this general field do not extend beyond the particular issuer involved and
should not be relied upon by any other person or by the persons receiving the prior
letters for any other offerings.
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The consequent lack of certainty in the definition of condominium
security renders the task of securities attorneys extremely troublesome.
The probable result is that responsible counsel will be forced to recommend the expensive course of securities law compliance in any case
that even remotely approaches the parameters suggested by the release
and published staff responses. 62 Businessmen will then have to make
the unsatisfactory choice of costly compliance or risky noncompliance
in an atmosphere of uncertainty. The end result is a needless increase
in the cost of doing business, which will be passed on to the consumer
without demonstrable regulatory benefit or investor protection. It thus
becomes obvious that further definitive action is incumbent upon the
Commission. No useful purpose is served by leaving this area of law in
an amorphous state.

IV.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

A.

Section 11(d)(1)

Despite the numerous ingredients necessary to develop a condominium project, the success or failure of the venture will ultimately
depend on the developer's ability to sell the individual units at a profit.
However, the dual nature of the condominium, which would result
from its being deemed a security, can significantly complicate the sales
function. First, the condominium is real estate 63 and, as with the sale
of other real estate, sales people must be licensed by the state as real
estate salesmen or brokers. 64 Where the condominium is also a security, however, the sales person may fall within the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act 65 definition of a securities broker or dealer 66 and become subject to the numerous requirements under the securities

laws. 61
If the sales person is deemed to be a broker or dealer, section
62. One writer has suggested:

[Tihe following tests [to determine the existence of a security] may be applied by one
who is considering the development of condominiums or resort property:
(1) Does the developer offer the property primarily as a permanent residence or as a

vacation spot with investment potential?
(2) Does the developer emphasize the potential that the property has for appreciation, or does he specifically instruct his salesmen not to mention growth potential of the
property?
(3) Does the developer present a plan or arrangement under which he or another
entity (related or unrelated) will manage and rent the property for the direct or indirect
benefit of the purchaser?
(4) Does the developer's plan affirmatively deny any interest or intent in managing
the project?
(5) Does the purchaser have complete freedom to occupy or rent his unit according
to his own desires?
63. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 711.04(1) (1973).
64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 475 (1973).
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4),(5) (1970).

67. See text accompanying notes 87-121 infra.
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11(d)(1) of the 1934 Act 68 and the margin requirements 69 are

triggered. 70 Section 11(d)(1) makes it unlawful for anyone who transacts business as both a broker and dealer to extend or arrange for the
extension of credit to a customer on a non-exempt security "which was
a part of a new issue in the distribution of which he participated as a
member of a selling syndicate or group within thirty days prior to such
transaction ....
,,7" Thus, arrangement of mortgage financing by a
sales person deemed to be a broker-dealer would be barred by section
11(d)(1), although this is routinely done by developers or their sales
people as part of a condominium sales effort.
B.

Section 7 and Regulation T

Developers or their sales personnel deemed to be securities brokers or dealers will also be subject to the margin requirement, a method
by which Congress controls the extension of credit for the purchase of
securities. 7 2 The term margin is generally used to refer to the minimum
percentage of the total purchase price that must be paid in cash by the
purchaser of a security. For example, if the margin requirement is 75
percent, the purchaser of a security which costs $100 must pay $75 in
cash. Credit may then be extended on the remaining $25 of the
purchase price. Thus, by raising or lowering the margin requirements,
the relative ease or difficulty by which a security may be purchased on
credit may be controlled.
73
Under section 7(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Congress established the initial margin requirements. 74 Realizing the
need for flexibility, however, section 7(b) provides the Federal Reserve
Board with the authority to raise or lower the margin "as it deems
necessary or appropriate for the accommodation of commerce and
industry.

. .

. "75

Section 7(C) 7 6 makes it "unlawful for any member of a national
securities exchange or any broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to
extend ...

or arrange for the extension ...

of credit" on a non-exempt

security 7 7 in contravention to the rules prescribed by the Federal
Reserve Board. Pursuant to the authority given by this statute, the
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d) (1) (1970).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970).
70. The requirements of § 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are applicable as
well. These are discussed in the text accompanying note 89 infra.
71.
72.

15 U.S.C. § 78k(d)(1) (1970).
12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1974).

73. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1970).
74. The initial margin requirements intended as a guide for the Federal Reserve Board,
were the higher of (1) 55 percent of the current market price of the security, or (2) 100 percent of
the lowest market price of the security during the preceding 36 calendar months, but not more
than 75 percent of the current market price. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(b) (1970).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970).
77. See section 3(a)(12) of the Securities Act of 1934 for the definition of an exempted
security. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
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Federal Reserve Board adopted Regulation T 78 which controls the
extension of credit by brokers and dealers.
The Federal Reserve Board has manifested a clear intention to
include the condominium security within the scope of Regulation T by
proposing an amendment to section 220.6 of the regulation. This
amendment would read as follows:
Credit for the purpose of purchasing or carrying any part of
an investment contract security (for example, but not limited
to ... the condominium ownership part of a program to own
and rent a unit through a rental pool or otherwise)
shall be
deemed to be credit on the entire security. 79
This amendment was proposed to negate a view previously held by the
Federal Reserve Board that Regulation T would not be violated where
the investment was divisible into a real estate component and a security component and the credit was extended solely to finance the real
estate portion in the form of a conventional mortgage. 80
The impact of applying Regulation T to the condominium developer (assuming that he is a securities broker or dealer) is quite
significant since a large portion of condominium sales are dependent
upon the arrangement of suitable financing. The effect of'Regulation T
is to completely bar the developer from extending credit or even
arranging mortgage financing for the purchase of a condominium unit.
The reason for this is that the broker or dealer is only permitted to
extend credit on certain categories of securities prescribed by the
Federal Reserve Board. 8 1 These categories include securities registered
on a national securities exchange, 82 stocks on the Federal Reserve
84
3
Board's over-the-counter trading list, 8 and exempted securities.
Since condominiums do not fall within any of these categories, no
credit can be extended by the broker or dealer to finance the
purchase.8 5 Likewise, the developer is prohibited from arranging for
mortgage financing since a securities broker is permitted to arrange for
financing only on the same terms that he could employ in extending
credit to others. 86 The developer who is classified as a broker-dealer is
thereby faced with the unpleasant alternative of leaving the purchaser
to arrange for his own financing.
78. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1974).

79. Proposed F.R.B. Reg. § 220.6(1), 38 Fed. Reg. 34988 (1973).
80. 38 Fed. Reg. 34988 (1973).
81. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.8 (1974).
82. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(d) (1974).
83. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(e) (1974).
84. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(g) (1974).
85. The Federal Reserve Board has already decided that Regulation T completely bars the
extension of credit for the purchase of tax shelter securities, usually in the form of a limited
partnership. 12 C.F.R. § 220.124 (1974). Presumably, Regulation T would be applied to condominium securities in the same manner.
86. 12 C.F.R. § 220.7(a) (1974).
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C. Brokers and Dealers
In planning the sales aspects of his project, a condominium developer can elect either to contract with an outside agency to provide
sales personnel or perform the selling function himself. If he elects to
utilize the services of an outside agency, the developer will be faced
with Regulation T and section 11(d)(1) problems since the outside
agency will almost certainly fall within the statutory definition of a
87
broker or a dealer.
If the developer chooses to perform the selling function himself,
then he may either form a separate sales company, or he may simply
hire sales personnel to sell his units. In either case, it is possible that
those selling the condominiums may be deemed securities brokers or
dealers and thus, in addition to the credit extension provisions, the
developer will be subject to section 15 of the Securities Exchange

Act.

88

Section 15(a) 89 requires that every broker and dealer register with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 9" unless exempt. 91 Registered brokers and dealers are also subject to net capital
requirements, 92 special bookkeeping and reporting requirements 93 and
special anti-fraud provisions. 94 In addition, a broker or dealer must
either become a member of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), 95 an organization which imposes additional standards and reporting requirements, or become subject to a similar set of
rules and requirements administered by the Commission. 9 6 In both
cases, the rules are geared toward the more traditional securities
broker or dealer who deals in stocks and bonds, including a require87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(4),(5) (1970).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1970). For more detail on the broker-dealer requirements, see Augustine & Fass, Broker-DealerLicensing in the Field of Real Estate Syndication, 29 Bus. Lawyer
369 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Augustine & Fass].
89. 15 U.S.C. § 780(a) (1970).
90. The Real Estate Advisory Committee of the Securities and Exchange Commission has
suggested that brokers and dealers of condominium securities be required to register only through
a short form examination focusing on those portions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts relating to fraud.
[L]icensed real estate brokers and sales persons . . . should be exempt from the
broker-dealer reporting and regulatory requirements under the 1934 Act where their
sales of real estate securities are limited to . . . condominiums and cooperatives.
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,265, at 82,775 (Oct. 12, 1972). The
Commission is now considering such an exemption.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 780(a)(2) (1970). Section 15(a)(2) gives the SEC the authority to make
exemptions from the registration requirements,
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1974).
93. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-3 through -5 (1974).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 780(c) (1970).
95. The National Association of Securities Dealers [hereinafter referred to as NASD] plans
to offer an examination for real estate salesmen who are currently selling real estate securities,
which will lead to a limited license to sell condominium securities and limited partnerships. This
test will eventually become a prerequisite to NASD membership. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.
268, A-24 (1974).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)8 (1970). Persons subject to such rules are brokers or dealers [hereinafter referred to as SECO].
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ment that all salesmen complete a general securities examination. 97
This makes the task of finding personnel qualified to sell the condominium unit especially difficult, since salesmen must become knowledgeable in the more traditional securities markets as well as in real
estate.98
In addition, brokers and dealers are subject to rule 15c2-5 99
whether or not they are registered with the Commission.10 0 This rule
makes it a fraudulent practice to extend or arrange credit unless the
broker or dealer delivers to the purchaser a written statement setting
forth the risks, disadvantages, obligations and all discounts under the
loan. 10 1 The broker or dealer must also obtain from the purchaser
information concerning his financial situation and needs, and from this
make a determination
that the entire transaction, including the loan arrangement, is
suitable for such person, and deliver[s] to such person a
written statement setting forth the basis upon
which the
0 2
broker or dealer made such determination.1
These rules do not apply, however, to a broker or dealer who arranges
for or extends credit subject to and in compliance with the require03
ments of Regulation T.
The condominium developer may, however, be able to obtain
relief from these laws by qualifying for either the issuer exemption or
the intrastate exemption. An issuer' 0 4 selling his own securities
qualifies for the issuer exemption when he does not fall within the
10 5
Securities Exchange Act definition of a broker or dealer.
The Securities Exchange Act defines the term dealer as:
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities for his own account . . . but does not include . . .
any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b8-1(a) (1974).

98. See note 95 supra.
99. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as rule 15c2-5].
100. State of Ohio Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Securities, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,558, at 83,523 (1973).
101.
102.
103.

17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5(a)(1) (1974).
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5(a)(2) (1974) (emphasis added).
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5(b) (1974).

104. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (1970).
105. While Augustine & Fass, correctly point out that "a broker-dealer who is exempt from
registration will not necessarily be exempt from regulation, while an issuer who is not a
broker-dealer to begin with, will be exempt from both registration and regulation," Augustine &
Fass, supra note 88, at 370 n.4, they are perhaps stretching a point in their contention that the
term "issuer exemption" is not really accurate. They assert that since the issuer is not deemed to
be a broker-dealer in the first instance, he cannot be considered "exempt" from regulations
governing brokers and dealers. Not wishing to belabor a question of semantics, we find the
importance of this distinction overemphasized, as in their explanation of the inaccuracy of the
term "exemption," the authors themselves point out that the issuer who is not a broker or dealer
is indeed "exempt from both registration and regulation."
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account, individually or in some10 fiduciary
capacity, but not
6
as a part of a regular business.
Notably, in order to be a dealer under this definition, a person must be
in the business of both buying and selling securities. The condominium
developer, as an issuer, only sells securities and thus would not be a
dealer within the above statutory definition. Moreover, since one must
be both a broker and a dealer in order to be subject to the section
1 1(d)(1) prohibition against the extension of or arrangement for the
extension of credit, 10 7 and since the developer generally sells only
condominium securities, he is not subject to section 11(d)(1).
It is not necessary to buy as well as sell in order to be deemed a
broker, which is defined as "any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions . . . for the account of others ... ."108 The

Commission has maintained, however, that an issuer and its bona fide
employees who sell their own securities on a non-recurring basis1 0 9 are
not required to register as brokers. 10 Consequently, a condominium
developer and his bona fide employees would be neither brokers nor
dealers.
The possibility still remains that the personnel actually selling the
units may not be bona fide employees, and thus may themselves be
brokers. Whether a person is actually a bona fide employee will, of
course, depend upon the facts of each individual case, the considerations being much the same as those that were used at common law to
111
distinguish between the servant and the independent contractor.
Factors that have been suggested 1 2 for making this determination
include: (1) the employee must be compensated by salary, not commission; (2) the employer must assume the responsibility of withholding
and social security taxes; and (3) the salesman must be employed with
the issuer both before and after the conclusion of the offering. Additional criteria used by the Commission are that the employees have no
significant background in the securities business and that the salesman
must not be primarily engaged in the activity of selling securities. 113
The "intrastate exemption" encompasses two distinct concepts in
securities law. First, an issuer who offers and sells securities within a
single state is exempt from registering his securities under section
106. 15 U.S.C. § 7&(a)(5) (1970).

107. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1970).

109. See SEC No Action Letter, Inland Realty Inv., Inc., BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.
232, C-3 (1973).
110. The Woodmoor Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,653
(1973). See also Landcom, Inc., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,176
(1971).
111. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1298 (2d ed. 1961).

112. See Augustine & Fass, supra note 88, at 371.
113. The Woodmoor Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
(1972).
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3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933.114 This idea must be kept
separate from the exemption from registration under section 15(a) of
the 1934 Act of the broker or dealer "whose business is exclusively
intrastate." 1 15
The two exemptions have not been construed identically by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, with the section 15(a) exemption
apparently being much narrower in scope. While the primary concern
of the 3(a)( 1) exemption is that the securities be offered and sold only
to bona fide residents of the state, in order to qualify for the section
15(a) exemption, the broker's or dealer's entire business must also be
transacted solely within the state. 116 It is thus possible that a broker or
dealer may be required to register under section 15(a), even though he
only sells securities exempt from registration under section 3(a)( 11). 117
Both the intrastate exemption from registration of securities under
section 3(a)(11) and the intrastate exemption from registration of
brokers and dealers under section 15(a) have an effect (or at least may
have an effect) on the credit and other broker-dealer requirements.
The effects of the section 3(a)(1 1) exemption on the necessity to
comply with Regulation T is not certain at this time. While no clear
statement has yet been issued by the Federal Reserve Board, 118 there
is some indication that securities exempt from registration under this
section do not "have the impact on the securities market of the kind
with which the Board was directed to concern itself under Section 7 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."''1 9
If the Federal Reserve Board does eventually determine that
securities sold under the section 3(a)(11) exemption are subject to
Regulation T, brokers and dealers will, of course, be completely barred from extending or arranging for the extension of credit for the
purchase of the condominium security sold under this exemption. In
addition, the Commission, assuming this to be the case, has held that a
broker or dealer who extends credit for the purchase of a security
exempt under section 3(a)(11) will also be in violation of rule 15c2-5.' I2
Even though this rule is excluded from application where credit is
arranged in compliance with Regulation T, "[i]f the credit transaction
is not permissible under Regulation T, this exclusion is
unavailable.''2 It should be noted that even if the securities sold
114. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970).
115.

15 U.S.C. § 780(a) (1970).

116. See Augustine & Fass, supra note 88, at 372.
117. See SEC No Action Letter, D.L. Burlage, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 130, C-3
(1971).
118. See Letter from Federal Reserve Board to Mark E. Perrin, May 18, 1973, in 2 REAL
ESTATE SECURITIES 453 (1974).
119. Letter from Michael A. Greenspan, Assistant Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board,
in 2 REAL ESTATE SECURITIES 473 (1974).
120. State of Ohio, Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Securities, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
79,558, at 83,523 (1973).
FED. SEC. L. REP.
121. Id. at 83,5231.
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under the section 3(a)(11) exemption are not subject to Regulation T,
the transaction would still be subject to the requirements of rule
15c2-5.
The exemption from registration of securities under section
3(a)(11) will, of course, have no effect upon the requirement of the
broker or dealer who sells these securities to register with the Commission under section 15. In addition, as the tests that determine whether
one qualifies for the intrastate exemption from registration of securities
under section 3(a)(11) are not identical to the tests employed for the
intrastate exemption from registration of brokers and dealers under
section 15(a), qualification for the former does not necessarily imply
qualification for the latter. Likewise, a broker-dealer who arranges for
credit on a security exempt from registration under section 3(a)(11) will
still be affected by section 11(d)(1).
Qualification for the intrastate exemption of section 15(a) will not
effect the necessity to comply with Regulation T or section 11(d)(1),
since the latter apply to any broker-dealer whether registered or not.
In addition, since the broker or dealer is precluded from extending or
arranging for credit on the purchase of a condominium security, he
would still be subject to rule 15c2-5. However, the intrastate exemption under section 15(a) will, of course, preclude the necessity of the
broker or dealer registering with the Commission, as well as with the
other requirements of registered brokers and dealers.
V.

STATUTORY ANALYSIS
122

A. Section 11(d)(1)
Rule
was proposed by the Commission because of its
view that section 1 1(d)(1) and the margin requirements authorized by
section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act were too restrictive to condominium developers in light of the problems these sections were
designed to alleviate.124 The proposed rule will, under certain
conditions, 125 provide an exemption from the margin requirements
and section 1 1(d)(1) for condominium securities. In order to determine
whether the view of the Commission is correct, the legislative history
of these two sections must be examined.
Section 1 1(d)(1) was not enacted for the purpose of controlling
credit. Rather, it was designed to be a partial remedy to the general
problem of conflict of interest inherent when the functions of a broker
and dealer are combined within a single person. 126 The broker, as one
3a12-51 23

122. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d)(1) (1970).
123. Proposed Rule 3a12-5, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 21,195 (June 7, 1974). This rule is
analyzed in section VI infra.
124. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-10845, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,809 (June 7, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 10845].
125. See text accompanying notes 151-54 infra.
126. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 792].
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who effects transactions for the account of others, 127 enters into a
fiduciary relationship with his client and is therefore bound to render
disinterested advice that is in his client's best interest. This responsibility is, however, incompatible with the function of a dealer, who buys
28
and sells securities for his own accounts.1
In enacting the statute, Congress believed that one of the greatest
dangers inherent in the combination of the broker and dealer functions
in one individual arose where credit to purchase a security was ex129
tended by one who participated in the distribution of the security.
Thus, the enactment of section 11(d)(1) insured that one who is a
broker and a dealer "will not induce his customers to buy on credit
130
securities which he has undertaken to distribute to the public.'
It is readily apparent, however, that the rationale behind the
passage of section 1 1(d)(1) is not applicable to the sales of condominium securities, in light of the manner in which the purchase of a
condominium is traditionally financed. The seller of the condominium,
whether he is an outside broker or the developer, rarely extends credit
himself. While the developer usually has a commitment from a lending
institution, this generally amounts to no more than a promise by the
lender to examine the credit-worthiness of a prospective purchaser.
The decision whether to grant the loan is entirely within the discretion
of the lender.
This is in contrast to the manner in which credit is extended for
the purchase of the more traditional forms of securities. For this type
of transaction, the credit is extended by a broker-dealer himself. In
addition, the decision whether to grant the loan does not depend so
much upon the credit-worthiness of the purchaser, as it does upon the
riskiness and the liquidity of the security sold.
B. Section 7131 and Margin Requirements
Because excessive use of credit tends to exaggerate fluctuations in
the stock market, it was believed that the lack of control over margin
requirements was a major cause of the stock market crash of 1929.132
Designed to reduce the possibility of another such disaster, section 7 is
essentially concerned with three problems: 133 (1) Preventing excessive
127.

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1970).

128. At the time that the Securities Exchange Act was being considered for passage, critics
of the stockbrokerage business argued that this potential conflict of interest was so great that the
functions of the broker and dealer should be completely separated. S. REP. No. 792, supra note
126, at 11. Congress felt, however, that such drastic action was unnecessary at that time, and
instead in section 11(e) directed the Commission to investigate the feasibility of the complete
segregation of the functions of brokers and dealers. See SEC, STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY AND
ADVISABILITY OF THE COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALERS AND BROKERS, (1936).

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

S. REP. No. 792, supra note 126, at 12.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934).
15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970).
S. REP. No. 792, supra note 126, at 3.
See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1242 (2d ed. 1961). But see Moore, Stock

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

use of credit for the purchase of securities; 134 (2) reducing exaggerated
fluctuations in the stock market; 135 (3) protecting "the margin purchaser by making it impossible for him to buy securities on too thin a36
margin."1
Although to a certain extent, the concerns of section 7 may be
somewhat applicable to condominium securities, the section was actually written with the more traditional type security in mind, i.e.,
stocks and bonds. Thus, because the nature of the condominium
security is sufficiently different from the traditional security (for example, the lack of a secondary trading market), the problems section 7
was designed to alleviate are for the most part inapplicable.
1.

PREVENTING THE EXCESSIVE USE OF CREDIT

A House Report which accompanied the Securities Exchange Bill
of 1934 provides some insight into the possible consequences of permitting excessive use of credit for the purchase of securities. The report
states:
The main purpose [of the margin provisions] is to give a
government credit agency an effective method of reducing the
aggregate amount of credit which can be directed by speculation into the stock market and out of the more desirable uses
of commerce and industry .... 137
The argument that margin requirements are necessary because
credit is diverted from business in the aggregate into non-productive,
speculative uses was often suggested by those who opposed allowing
the use of credit for the purchase of securities. 13 8 This argument,
however, is fallacious, and, in any case, is not applicable to the
condominium security. The funds created by loans to buy securities
are eventually directed to the sellers. These sellers are either issuers of
the securities who use the money for various business purposes, or
previous owners of the securities who use the money for consumption
or other investments. In both cases, the money is being used productively in the economy.139
Where credit is extended for the purchase of a condominium
security, the proceeds of the loan are channeled into the hands of the
developers who use them to finance the actual construction of the
condominium. The argument that the credit has been diverted into a
nonproductive and speculative use is, thus, especially inappropriate
Market Margin Requirements, 74 J. POL. ECON. 158 (1966) (empirical study indicating that

margin requirements have not actually accomplished any of these purposes).
134. 15 U.S.C. 78g(a) (1970). See also H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934).
135. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1242-43 (2d ed. 1961).
136. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).

137. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
138. See E. A. GOLDENWEISER, AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY 150-51 (1951) [hereinafter
cited as GOLDENWEISER].

139. Id.
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where the condominium security is concerned, as the credit has enabled the construction of a useful commodity.
The House Report goes on to state that the purpose of the margin
provisions is also
to prevent a recurrence of the pre-crash situation where funds
which would otherwise have been available at normal interest rates for uses of local commerce, industry, and agriculture, were drained by far higher
rates into security loans and
140
the New York call market.
This argument does have some merit, at least when applied to the
extension of credit for the purchase of stocks and bonds. Where credit
is diverted into security loans, it becomes more difficult for other local
concerns in the area to obtain credit which otherwise would have been
available for local business or consumption. The money created by the
security loans is channeled to the issuers or the previous owners of the
securities who are not likely to be situated within the local community.
Thus, while security credit does not divert credit or money away from
business in the aggregate, it may have the result of making it more
difficult for particular local concerns to borrow. 141
This argument is not applicable, however, when credit is being
extended for the purchase of a condominium security. The purchase of
the individual unit is generally financed by a lending institution in the
area in which the condominium is being built. The proceeds of the
loan are, therefore, being used to finance construction of the condominium development and the credit is being used for local commerce and business.
There is, however, a more fundamental reason for preventing the
excessive use of credit for the purchase of securities, based upon the
function of the Federal Reserve Board. The primary objective of the
Federal Reserve Board is to promote a healthy, growing economy
through regulation of the money supply. The bulk of the money supply
in the United States consists of demand deposits which are primarily
created by loans from commercial banks. 14 2 Through the regulation of
bank credit, the Federal Reserve Board increases or decreases the
supply of money, depending upon the particular needs of the economy
at any given time. This is generally accomplished by controlling the
total volume rather than trying to control selected types of credit, since
an attempt to restrict credit in one area will only divert it into another
area. The total amount of credit, and, hence, the money supply, will
remain unchanged.
When economic conditions are such that it appears security prices
wil be on the rise, and many buyers may thus be willing to borrow at
high interest rates to take advantage of projected appreciation, general
140. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934).
141. See GOLDENWEISER, supra note 138, at 151.
142. See G. BACH, ECONOMICS 133 (6th ed. 1968).
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credit controls will not effectively prevent the expansion of credit used
to purchase securities. Margin requirements are thereby needed by the
Federal Reserve Board to fill the gap in monetary policy when general
controls are rendered ineffective. 143
This argument does have a great deal of merit and could be used
to support the contention that margin requirements should be applied
to condominium securities. With the rapid advance of real estate
prices, borrowers may be willing to pay higher interest rates because of
the significant capital appreciation that is to be achieved. This could
have the effect of diverting large amounts of credit to the sale of real
estate during a period in which the Federal Reserve Board is attempting to restrict the expansion of credit.
The argument is somewhat mitigated, however, because mortgage
credit has historically been shown to be very sensitive to general credit
controls, thus eliminating the major justification for selective controls
in this area. General controls can be quite effective because small
increases in the interest rate have a significant impact upon the
monthly mortgage payment. 144 Even the prospective capital appreciation together with the investment characteristics of the condominium
security would probably not be great enough to induce the prospective
buyer to purchase the condominium where there is a large increase in
mortgage payments.
In addition, because of the lack of a secondary trading market,
the speculator is less likely to divert his spending to condominium
securities than if such a market were in existence. The efficient secondary trading for stocks and bonds makes immediate liquidation possible and provides prompt access to information-two very important
factors to the speculator. In contrast, because no real secondary trading market exists for it, real estate has always been a much less liquid
investment, with the purchase and sale traditionally being a slow and
cautious process involving title examinations and credit checks. The
possibility of quick profits from "in and out" transactions, the objective of every speculator, is substantially eliminated.
2.

PREVENTING UNDUE MARKET FLUCTUATIONS

Because unrestricted use of credit can cause severe fluctuations in
the prices of securities, a second function of margin requirements is "to
prevent undue market volatility by exerting a positive stabilizing effect
on the market.' 1 4 5 In the case of more traditional securities where
there exists a secondary trading market, these fluctuations can become
even more pronounced because of what is termed the pyramiding and
anti-pyramiding effect.
143. See J. BOGEN & H. KROOS, SECURITY CREDIT 47 (1960) [hereinafter cited as BOGEN &
KROOS].
144. See P. HORVITZ, MONETARY POLICY AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 366-67 (2d ed.
1969).
145. Release No. 10845, supra note 124.
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The pyramiding effect causes a pronounced rise in stock prices;
the price of a security rises, providing more collateral, which enables
the purchaser to borrow more money, thus increasing his ability to
46
purchase more securities, which causes the price to rise even higher. 1
While the pyramiding effect can occur for all types of securities, it is
even more prevalent where there exists a secondary trading market
because investors are promptly made aware that they have more
collateral upon which to borrow. 14 7 As there is no secondary trading
market for real estate, condominium securities are not significantly
affected by pyramiding.
Perhaps an even more important factor in market fluctuations is
the anti-pyramiding effect. When stock prices decline, impairing collateral for the loan, the broker will issue a margin call, i.e., he will
require additional collateral. If the purchaser is unwilling or unable to
comply, the broker will then sell the securities which will cause further
downward pressure on the stock market, thus leading to more margin
calls. 148 Because there are no margin calls in the real estate market,
the anti-pyramiding effect would not cause a decline in condominium
security prices.
The need to prevent undue market fluctuations caused by the
unrestricted use of credit which section 7 was designed to accomplish
is, therefore, not applicable to the condominium security. The lack of
a secondary trading market and the non-existence of margin calls
makes the condominium security sufficiently different to justify its
exemption from credit rules applied to the traditional security.
3.

PROTECTING THE MARGIN PURCHASER FROM

HIMSELF

The third purpose of the margin requirements is "to protect the
margin purchaser by making it impossible for him to buy on too thin a
margin.' 4 9 When a purchaser buys stock on too thin a margin and
there is a sudden drop in the market price, his equity is quickly eroded
and his broker will issue a margin call. If he is unable to meet the
margin call, he may be forced to sell at a loss.
Again, this concern is basically inapplicable to the condominium
security since there are no margin calls for real estate and the real
estate market generally does not fluctuate so drastically.
1 50
VI. PROPOSED RULE 3a12-5
Proposed rule 3a12-5 is entitled "Exemption of Certain Investment Contract Securities from Sections 7(c) and 11(d)(1)."' 51 This rule
146. See BOGEN & KROSS supra note 143, at 42.
147. Id. at 49.
148. Id. at 43.
149. Release No. 10845, supra note 124.
150. 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
21,195 (June 7, 1974) [hereinafter referred to as proposed
rule 3a12-5].
151. The full text of proposed rule 3a12-5 reads as follows:
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will, under certain conditions, provide an exemption from the margin
requirements and section 11(d)(1) for condominium securities.
In order to qualify for the exemption, the transaction must involve a statutory broker or dealer' 5 2 who, directly or indirectly, arranges for the extension of credit to or for a customer. The security
must involve an investment contract' 5 3 security dealing with direct
ownership of designated residential real property coupled with management services. 154
The proposed rule then provides the following mandatory conditions in order for the exemption to apply:
(1) The credit must be accompanied by a security interest,
such as a mortgage, lien, or deed of trust.
(2) The security interest must be solely in relation to the real
property.
(3) The amount of credit extended must be reasonably related to the fair market value of the real property at the
time the credit is extended.
A security shall be exempted from the provisions of Sections 7 (c) and 11 (d) (1) with
respect to any transaction by a broker or dealer who, directly or indirectly, arranges for
the extension or maintenance of credit on the security to or for a customer, if(a) The security is an investment contract security involving the direct ownership of
specified residential real property and related management services, and the credit:
(1) is secured by a lien, mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest which is
related only to such real real property;
(2) is reasonably related to the current market value of real property at the time the
credit is extended; and is to be repaid by regular payments of principal and interest
pursuant to an amortization schedule established by the governing instruments; and
(3) is extended by a lender which is not directly or indirectly controlling, controlled
by, or under common control with the broker or dealer or the issuer of the securities;
and
(b) such broker or dealer, before any purchase, loan or other related element of the
transaction is entered into:
(1) delivers to the customer a written statement setting forth the exact nature and
extent of (a) the customer's obligation under the particular loan arrangement, including,
among other things, the specified charges which he will incur under such loan in each
period during which the loan may continue to be extended, (b) the risks which he will
incur in the entire transaction, including the loan arrangement, and (c) all commissions,
discounts and other remuneration received and to be received in connection with the
entire transaction, including the loan arrangement, by the broker or dealer, and by any
person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the broker or dealer:
Provided, however, That the broker or dealer shall be deemed to be in compliance
with this subparagraph if the customer, before any purchase, loan or other related
element of the transaction is entered into in a manner legally binding upon the customer, receives a statement from the lender, or receives a prospectus or offering circular
from the broker or dealer, which statement, prospectus or offering circular contains the
information required by this subparagraph; and
(2) obtains from the customer information concerning his financial situation,
reasonably determines that the entire transaction, including the loan arrangement, is
suitable for him, and delivers to him a written statement setting forth the basis upon
which the broker or dealer made such determination.
152. See text accompanying notes 106-08 supra.
153. See text accompanying notes 13-31 supra.
154. This language appears to relate to the terms of Release No. 33-5347, which attempted
to define the circumstances under which a condominium would be a security. See text accompanying notes 46-51 supra.
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(4) The credit extension contract must include a regular
amortization schedule of payments.
(5) The payments must include installments of both principal and interest on the loan.
(6) The party extending the credit is not permitted to have
any type of management or ownership control relationship with either the broker or dealer, or the issuer of the
securities.
(7) Before the purchase or credit aspects of the transaction
are executed, the broker or dealer must make a full
written disclosure to the prospective purchaser. This
disclosure may either be in the form of a prospectus (or
"offering circular") or it may be simply a written statement containing the following items:
(a) the exact nature and extent of the customer's loan
obligations;
(b) the credit charges for which the customer is responsible during the entire term for which the loan may
be extended;
(c) the risks towhich the customer is subject, both with
regard to the loan, and with regard to the purchased
security itself; and
(d) all commissions, discounts and other payments in
connection with either the purchase itself or the loan,
which are received by brokers, dealers, or those in a
control relationship with them.
(8) The broker or dealer must obtain from the prospective
purchaser his current financial status.
(9) The broker or dealer must reasonably determine that the
entire transaction, including the loan arrangement, is
suitable for the prospective purchaser in the light of his
current financial status.
(10) The broker or dealer must deliver to the prospective
customer a written statement detailing the basis upon
which he made his suitability determination.
A.

Analysis of Proposed Rule 3a12-5 Suitability

While the proposed rule's exemption from the margin requirements is a welcome relief to the condominium developer, and is
certainly justified in light of the purposes of these provisions, the
conditions for the exemption imposed by the rule are quite troublesome, and, in fact, may cause as many problems as the rule was
designed to alleviate. One of the most vexatious conditions is the
required suitability disclosure. The suitability requirements under
proposed rule 3a12-5 undoubtedly hafi as their genesis the "suitability
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rules" promulgated by the NASD 15 or others 1 6 which were originally
intended as ethical standards designed to promote fair dealing with the
public.' 5 7 While, in the past, the Commission has brought several
disciplinary actions against broker-dealers under the suitability rules,
they primarily involved themselves with excessive trading or "churning" of a customer's account, 15 8 blatant examples of a broker recommending high risk securities to customers of modest means and little
market experience, 159 or high pressure tactics. 160 These earlier cases
primarily dealt with the extreme, almost fraudulent situation which
went well beyond a mere violation of an ethical standard.
There had been an awareness of the need for suitability responsibility on the part of brokers and dealers since at least the 1930's, 161 but
pressure rose for greater professional responsibility in 1963 with the
publication of an SEC Special Study 1 62 which concluded that there
16 3
were serious gaps in the standards applied to brokers and dealers.
Following this study, 164 which had been prompted by the excesses
in the speculative securities market of the late 1950's and early
1960's, 16. the suitability doctrine underwent intensive discussion to
155. CCH NASD MANUAL
2152, art. III (Rules of Fair Practice) § 2 (1968). Section 2
provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable
for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to
his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
156. The Commission (SECO) rule applicable to nonmembers of the NASD, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15b10-3 (1974) reads:
Every nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person who recommends to a
customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security shall have reasonable grounds
to believe that the recommendation is not unsuitable for the customer on the basis of
information furnished by such customer after reasonable inquiry concerning the
customer's investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any other information known by such broker or dealer or associated persons.
2405 (1974), provides:
New York Stock Exchange Rule 405, found at CCH NYSE GUIDE
"Every member organization is required . . . [to] use due diligence to learn the essential facts
...
American
relative to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted.
Stock Exchange Rule 411 is to the same effect.
157. See Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers:The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 464 [hereinafter cited as Mundheim]; cf. Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
158. E.g., R.H. Johnson & Co., 33 S.E.C. 180 (1952); C H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C.
347 (1945).
159. E.g., Phillips & Co., 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956).
160. E.g., Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133 (1960).
161. The NASD Rules of Fair Practice have included suitability requirements since that
organization was founded in 1938. Mundheim, supra note 157, at 450-51.
162. SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
163. Mundheim, supra note 157, at 445. The suitability rule is based on a reasonable basis
test, i.e., the broker-dealer must have a reasonable basis for making a recommendation to a
customer. This reasonable basis test evolved from common law concepts of fraud and misrepresentation. Rice, Recommendations by a Broker-Dealer: The Requirement for a Reasonable
Basis, 25 MERCER L. REv. 537 (1974).
164. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 162.
165. Mundheim, supra note 157, at 459.
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define its meaning and limitations. 166 The SEC urged strengthening its
protection for investors, 167 while the NASD membership feared that
publication of a statement 168 defining the content of the suitability
doctrine would help convert an ethical standard into a rule of law.169
The effect of that would be to subject a broker-dealer to a civil suit in
which a dissatisfied customer might make a broker-dealer a guarantor
of successful investment.
Indeed, the fears of the NASD membership turned out to be
somewhat warranted, for a number of civil actions for damages were
brought against broker-dealers for violation of the suitability rules.
Fortunately for the broker-dealers, however, the courts have been
reluctant to recognize a private remedy not expressly afforded by the
securities laws. 170 While not expressly ruling on the issue because the
plaintiff was barred by estoppel, the court in Hecht v. Harris, Upham
& Co.171 stated:
As to the N.A.S.D. "suitability" rule . . .upon which

plaintiff relies in part in this case, the question arises whether
it is the kind of rule upon which a civil action for damages...
can be based. Conceivably, a broker might honestly think
that his "ground" for believing his recommendation "suitable" is "reasonable" only to find himself overruled in a law
suit and found guilty of fraud notwithstanding his good faith
.... [T]he practical consequences of allowing private federal
damage suits based on rules of this kind, and involving
judicial
review
of market judgments,
would be
72
considerable. 1

Based upon the reasoning in the Hecht case, several courts have
since held that a violation of the NASD suitability rule does not per se
give rise to civil liability. 173 Only in one California decision has a court
adopted the position that "[g]ood ethics should not be ignored by the
166. Id. at 460.

167. The SEC position was outlined in the SPECIAL STUDY in these words:
Greater emphasis should be given by the Commission and the self-regulatory bodies to
the concept of suitability of particular customers. The NASD, which has taken leadership in this respect by adopting a general suitability rule, should provide further
definition of content and more effective surveillance and enforcement.
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 162, at 329.
168. Actually, such a statement was published by the NASD on October 9, 1964. It was
called Guideline on Fair Dealing with Customers, CCH NASD MANUAL G-7 to G-9, but was
ineffective in defining the scope of the suitability doctrine, since it consisted primarily of five
examples of conduct that would fail to meet the suitability standard.
169. Mundheim, supra note 157, at 463.
170. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1965).
171. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
172. 283 F. Supp. at 431.
173. Wells v. Blythe & Co., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Mercury Inv. Co. v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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law," and allowed
the plaintiff to recover in part, based upon suitabil74
ity standards. 1
The question of whether the suitability requirement under proposed rule 3a12-5 will.give rise to a civil action for damages is, of
course, evident. But now, the broker-dealer's fear of being sued by a
dissatisfied customer becomes even more justified since the basis upon
which the suit can be brought is elevated from a mere ethical standard
to a Commission rule. It is questionable, however, whether this elevation to rule of law status is appropriate to the condominium security in
light of its peculiar nature. The purchase of what essentially remains
real estate is dependent upon far more intangible factors than is the
purchase of a "conventional" security. For example, the offeree's personal tastes in appearance, construction type and quality, appliances,
recreational facilities, location, view, etc., all have an effect on the
suitability for the prospective purchaser. Obviously, these components
75
cannot possibly be made by a broker-dealer.'
In addition, it is questionable whether it is appropriate to impose
the burden of suitability determination on the broker-dealer in light of
the traditional manner in which the condominium is financed. The
purchaser generally obtains conventional mortgage financing from a
local lending institution which is in the practice of making daily credit
investigations that insure the "suitability" of each loan made. 176 Such
institutions are already regulated by state and federal agencies 177 and
are historically conservative in their suitability determinations. 178
Moreover, a purchaser of a condominium is probably conditioned to
giving a bank or savings and loan institution confidential financial
data that he would be loathe to give to a broker-dealer appearing in
the guise of a real estate salesman. 179 In any case, the latter is certainly
less well equipped to make realistic credit "suitability" determinations
than are the lenders. 180
A further difficulty with the suitability portion of the proposed
rule is the total absence of standards. That is, it suggests no criteria by
which to judge whether an offering is suitable to an offeree. 18 1 In
addition, the proposed rule gives no indication of the specificity in the
174. Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr.
222, 244 (1st Dist. 1968).

175. See letter from Roger G. Galloway, Vice President of Kaiser Aetna, Oakland, California to SEC, July 12, 1974.
176. See letter from John M. Collette, partner in the San Francisco firm of Collette & Ziegler
1974.
to SEC, August 14,

177. See letter from Peter M. Gunnar of the Portland, Oregon firm of Gunnar, Burkhart,
Armstrong & Associates to SEC, August 2, 1974.
178. See letter from Cades, Shutte, Flemming & Wright of Honolulu, Hawaii to SEC,
August 9, 1974.
179. See letter from Peter M. Gunnar of the Portland, Oregon firm of Gunnar, Burkhart,
Armstrong & Associates to SEC, August 2, 1974.
180. Id.
181. See letter from Cades, Shutte, Flemming & Wright of Honolulu, Hawaii to SEC,
August 9, 1974.
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written statement required to be given1 82to the offeree setting forth the
basis of the suitability determination.
Although the suitability requirement is not really appropriate at
all to the condominium security, the issue only becomes critical where
suitability becomes a basis for civil liability. Certainly there is little
objection to holding the broker-dealer to a high ethical standard which
would prevent him from using high pressure techniques on unsophisticated buyers. It would perhaps be preferable, therefore, to delete the
suitability requirement from the proposed rule and leave the broker183
dealer subject to the ethical standards of the NASD and SECO.
Simple deletion of this requirement is, however, insufficient since
the broker-dealer will still be subject to rule 15c2-5. 184 This rule
requires the broker-dealer to make suitability disclosures much the
same as are required in proposed rule 3a12-5 when he extends or
arranges for credit not subject to the provisions of Regulation T. Since
proposed rule 3a12-5 would exempt the broker-dealer who sells condominium securities from Regulation T, he would then become subject
to the suitability requirements of rule 15c2-5. In order to obviate the
problem, the proposed rule would have to specifically exempt condominium securities from rule 15c2-5. In any event, this points up the
redundancy of the proposed rule 3a12-5 suitability requirement, since
essentially the same disclosure requirements would already be made
mandatory by rule 15c2-5.
B. Other Conditions of the Rule
The proposed rule imposes a number of conditions for exemption
from the margin and section l1(d)(1) requirements other than suitability that are not without difficulty. The first of these is that security
must involve direct ownership of residential real property. An immediate question that arises is why the exemption is limited to residential property. Many condominiums are sold for industrial and commercial purposes and there does not seem to be any reason why the
exemption should not extend to this type of property.1 8 5 Indeed, one
can argue that the proposed rule does not even exempt most condominium securities sold as vacation retreat investments. This is either
because many of these condominiums are not lived in long enough
each year in order properly to define them as residences, or because the
units sold are really not large enough to constitute a true residence. 186
In addition, the exemption appears to be limited by the "direct
ownership" language in the rule to fee simple ownership. But there are
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 95, 96 supra.
See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
See letter from John M. Collette, partner in the San Francisco firm of Collette &

Zieglerr to SEC, August 14, 1974.

186. See letter from Cades, Shutte, Flemming & Wright of Honolulu, Hawaii to SEC,
August 9, 1974.
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many condominiums in Hawaii, Mexico and elsewhere that are sold
only with long term leasehold interests. The denial of an exemption to
these securities would seem to be neither consistent nor purposeful. 187
The proposed rule hinges receipt of the exemption from sections 7
and 11(d)(1) for real property securities on "related management services." This language suggests that the Commission desired the exemption to cover the type of real estate arrangement that was defined as a
security in Release No. 33-5347.188 But examination of the Release
No. 33-5347 guidelines shows that a condominium could be deemed to
be a security even if management services were not offered in conjunction with it. For example, the owner could simply be materially
restricted in his occupancy or the rental of his unit. 1 89 The difficulty
with the language in the proposed rule, therefore, is that it does not
appear to cover all real estate arrangements defined in Release No.
33-5347 as securities, and there would seem to be no good reason for
not doing so. 190
The proposed rule can, nevertheless, be construed to imply that
any investment in an arrangement consisting of "residential real property and related management services" may be deemed to be a security. Release No. 33-5347 makes it clear that this is not the case, but
the release is not a rule and is not incorporated by reference into
proposed rule 3a12-5. On this ground, some courts may elect not to
employ the Release No. 33-5347 standards, 19 1 the net effect of which
may be to include in the definition of a security certain arrangements
that even the Commission itself did not see fit to call a security.
Subparagraph (1)(a) of the proposed rule limits the exemption 19to2
credit secured by an interest which relates only to the real property.
This limitation is likely to pose difficulties for purchasers seeking
mortgage financing from lenders who quite reasonably might wish to
obtain additional protection for their security interests in the property.
For example, a lender may wish to take an assignment of rental
income from the purchaser, but the language of the rule appears to
prohibit this in an exempted transaction. Yet, there would seem to be
no useful purpose subserved by such a restriction. 193
As to subparagraph (a)(3) of the proposed rule, 194 a further
difficulty emerges. This provision would limit the exemption to situa187. Id.

188. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP
ter referred to as Release No. 33-5347].
189. Id.

79,163 (Jan. 4, 1973) [hereinaf-

at 82,540.

190. See letter from Stephen J. Weiss and Howell J. Reeves of the Washington firm of
Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn to SEC, August 15, 1974.
191. See letter from Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright of Honolulu, Hawaii to SEC,
August 9, 1974.
192. See note 151 supra.

193. See letter from Stephen J. Weiss and Howell J. Reeves of the Washington firm of
Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn to SEC, August 15, 1974.
194. See note 151 supra.
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tions where credit "is extended by a lender which is not directly or
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the
broker or dealer or the issuer of the securities .....
195 Such a
restriction is unquestionably meaningful in the context of the conventional securities market where a "hard sell" of securities on credit
might result through the affiliation of a lender with a broker, dealer or
issuer. Such a restriction, however, appears unnecessary in the context
of a real estate transaction because mortgage lenders are already
heavily regulated by state and federal agencies, and thus are almost
certain to make conservative loan commitments based upon creditworthiness of the borrower and foreclosure value of the real estate,
196
whether or not they are affiliated with the broker, dealer, or issuer.
Subparagraph (b) (1)197 deals with the disclosure requirements of
the rule. It requires that the customer be given a written statement
covering his obligations and costs under the loan, his risk, and a
commission schedule, possibly in the form of a prospectus or offering
circular. At first glance, this requirement seems sensible enough, but
the difficulty with it is that such a requirement is largely a duplication
of the disclosure requirements of Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve
Board' 98 which requires that a lender inform a borrower of all costs,
interest rates and charges. The redundancy should be eliminated.199
VII.

CONCLUSION

Despite its apparent shortcomings and inherent burdens of compliance, proposed rule 3a12-5 meets a genuine need of the condominium developer when the units of his project are deemed to be a
security. There can be no doubt that the determination of the Federal
Reserve Board that Regulation T applies to the credit financing of
condominiums would devastate that industry without the exemption
that rule 3a12-5 provides. The legislative history of sections 7 and
11(d) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and related statutory
and regulatory provisions clearly demonstrates they were never intended to apply to a condominium security, which has it own peculiar
attributes unknown to the conventional security. In fact, it is precisely
these attributes that insure that the interests of the investing public
will be protected despite the exemption from the standard statutory
scheme.
Unfortunately, the conceptual advantages of the proposed rule fail
to find practical application in several sectors of the condominium
195. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10845, BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 256,
E-1, E-2 (1974).
196. See, e.g., letter from Raymond R. Dickey, former chairman of the SEC Real Estate
Advisory Committee, and partner in the Washington firm of Danzausky, Dickey, Tydings, Quint
& Gordon to SEC, August 15, 1974.
197. See note 151 supra.
198. 12 C.F.R. § 226 [hereinafter referred to as Regulation Z].
199. See letter from William B. Ingersoll, General Counsel to American Land Development
Ass'n to SEC, August 15, 1974.
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security area. Specifically, the scope of the exemption offered by proposed rule 3a12-5 seems unnecessarily limited in at least three areas.
First, the exemption apparently fails to cover condominiums sold with
other than fee simple ownership, as, for example, long term leasehold
interests. Second, the proposed rule covers only residential condominiums, leaving commercial and industrial condominiums still subject to compliance with the extension of credit provisions for no
apparent reason. Third, the proposal does not appear to cover all the
situations defined in Release No. 33-5347 which could occur, for
example, if no management services were offered in connection with
the condominium. Again, there would seem to be no good reason why
the Commission would desire such a result. Most likely, this effect of
the rule's wording was inadvertent.
In addition to the limited scope of the proposal; several of the
conditions imposed for its use appear unnecessarily burdensome. The
first of these is the requirement that the security interest be related
only to the real property. A secured party should be permitted a
broader security interest if needed.
The second seemingly extraneous condition is the prohibition of
common control between the lender and a broker, dealer, or the issuer
of the securities. The extensive pre-existing state and federal regulation
of mortgage lenders precludes any need for this requirement.
A further needless condition is the disclosure requirement. The
truth in lending provisions of Regulation Z make further disclosure
confusing and redundant.
Perhaps the most burdensome provision of the rule is the suitability portion. This aspect adds enormously to the cost of compliance
with the rule, yet appears to add neither to the effectiveness of the
rule, nor to the protection of the investing public. This is because the
suitability requirement appears to be a totally unnecessary duplication
of rule 15c2-5.
It is submitted that the rule should not only be modified to delete
the suitability requirement, but that it should include an exemption
from rule 15c2-5 as well, leaving applicable only the NASD or SECO
ethical standards. This approach would promote ethical dealing with
the public's investment dollar, but would not invite an inference that a
condominium seller is a warrantor of a profitable investment by creating an implied private cause of action in a disappointed purchaser.
In summary, proposed rule 3212-5 represents a welcome and
worthy concept that is attired in flawed and tattered apparel. The rule
must be rewritten to adequately serve the purpose that inspired its
genesis.

